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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the setting
of large scale distributed systems, in which each
node needs to quickly process a huge amount of
data received in the form of a stream that may
have been tampered with by an adversary. In this
situation, a fundamental problem is how to detect
and quantify the amount of work performed by the
adversary. To address this issue, we propose AnKLe
(for Attack-tolerant eNhanced Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence Estimator), a novel algorithm for estimating
the KL divergence of an observed stream compared
to the expected one. AnKLe combines sampling
techniques and information-theoretic methods. It is
very efficient, both in terms of space and time
complexities, and requires only a single pass over
the data stream. Experimental results show that the
estimation provided by AnKLe remains accurate even
for different adversarial settings for which the quality
of other methods dramatically decreases.
Index Terms—Data Stream; Kullback-Leibler Di-
vergence; Sampling; Byzantine Adversary; Scalabil-
ity; Performance Analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this paper is to propose
an algorithm for estimating the similarity between
an observed data stream and the expected (i.e.
idealized) one in the context of massive data
streams. More precisely, we consider the setting
of large scale distributed systems, in which each
node needs to quickly process a huge amount of
data. Typically, this data corresponds to IP network
traffic, sensors readings, nodes identifiers or any
other data issued from distributed applications. For
instance, in IP network management, the analysis
of the stream may be used to detect the presence of
outliers or intrusions when changes in the commu-
nication patterns occur [1], to estimate the heaviest
users or the more popular sites [2], or to dy-
namically dimension routers. In sensors networks,
probabilistic laws modeling data streams are used
in tracking applications for estimating the position
of target sensors [3], or for correlating geographical
or environmental informations [4], [5]. Finally, in
large scale and dynamic systems, uniform sam-
pling is one of the fundamental primitive [6] that
allows for instance, by analyzing the information
gathered across the network, to estimate the size
of the system, its topological organization, or its
available resources so that efficient dissemination,
load-balancing or data-caching algorithms can be
designed and implemented [7], [8].
In the context of massive data streams, nodes
need to quickly process on the fly the flow of data.
Moreover, nodes can only locally store very limited
data and perform few operations on this data.
Additionally, it is often the case that if some data
has not been locally stored for further processing,
once it has been read, it cannot be read anymore
(this refers to the one-pass data streaming model).
The problem of detecting changes or outliers in
a data stream is similar to the problem of identi-
fying patterns that do not conform to the expected
behavior, which has been an active area of research
for many decades. For instance, depending on the
specificities of the domain considered and the type
of outliers considered, different methods have been
designed, namely classification-based, clustering-
based, nearest neighbor based, statistical, spectral,
and information theory. A comprehensive survey
of these techniques, their advantages and their
drawbacks is given in [9]. A common feature of
these techniques is their space complexity and
their computational cost, as they rely on full space
algorithms for analyzing their data.
Given our constraint settings — one-pass anal-
ysis of a huge amount of data with limited re-
sources, both in space and time— we propose
an algorithm to detect changes in the observed
stream with respect to an expected behavior by
relying on sampling techniques and information-
theoretic methods. More precisely, by adequately
sampling the observed data stream, we estimate
with high accuracy the distance between the ex-
pected stream and the observed one, and this even
if the stream has been tampered with by an ad-
versary. The metric, we use in our context is the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, which can be
viewed as an extension of the Shannon entropy and
is often referred to as the relative entropy [10].
Citing Chakrabarti et al., [11], “[...] rationale of
estimating entropy-based distances is that there
are intimate connections between the randomness
of traffic sequences (formalized as the entropy)
and the propagation of malicious events. Indeed,
detecting sudden changes in a stream may be a
good indicator of attacks”.
Our main contribution is the proposition of An-
KLe (Attack-tolerant eNhanced Kullback-Leibler
divergence Estimator), an algorithm that estimates
the relative entropy between the observed stream
and the expected ones in the context of mas-
sive data streams. As introduced above, AnKLe
combines information-theoretic and sampling tech-
niques to estimate accurately the relative entropy,
while using only a memory of small size to cope
with the very strict space constraint. Extensive
simulations indicate that while AnKLe rely on
sampling techniques, the accuracy of the estimation
is very high. AnKLe, as a data streaming algo-
rithm, benefits from their desired properties such
as low computational and storage costs and one-
pass processing of the stream. Therefore, AnKLe
is perfectly adapted to the setting in which data
must be read and process quickly. Finally, An-
KLe is versatile enough to cope with any type of
input distribution, including distribution that have
been generated by an adversary. To the best of
our knowledge, an algorithm combining all these
strengths for the estimation of relative entropy has
never been published before in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. First, Sec-
tion II reviews the related work on the estima-
tion of the relative entropy of data streams while
Section III-A describes the data stream model
as well as the adversary model considered. Sec-
tion III-B briefly introduces the concepts of in-
formation theory that we intensively use in this
work. Section IV-A presents the different buildings
blocks of our algorithm and finally Section IV-B
describes AnKLe, our data streaming algorithm
for estimating the relative entropy of a stream. In
Section V, we empirically evaluate the accuracy of
the estimation provided by AnKLe by comparing
it to the exact value of the KL divergence on dif-
ferent data streams and also to adapted versions of
state-of-the-art estimator-based algorithms, namely,
Alon et al. [12] and Chakrabrti et al. [13]. Finally,
we conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this paper, we consider the Kullback-Leibler
(i.e., the relative entropy) estimation problem. In
information theory, the concept of entropy corre-
sponds to the uncertainty of a random variable, and
as a special case, the entropy of a stream quantifies
the randomness of a data stream. On the other hand,
relative entropy measures the difference between
two distributions, and therefore the data stream
relative entropy quantifies the amount of informa-
tion separating one specific observed stream from
expected ones.
Previous works have proposed efficient algo-
rithms (in sublinear space, and sometimes even
polylogarithmic space, in the size of the stream) to
accurately estimate the entropy of a data stream.
Most of these works rely on the seminal algorithm
designed by Alon, Matias and Szegedy [12]. In
their work, the authors estimate the k-th frequency
moment Fk of a data stream, a statistic directly
related to the input stream (cf., Section III-B). For
instance, the frequency moment F0 corresponds to
the number of distinct items in a stream while F1
represents the size of the stream. Subsequently to
this work, Guha et al. [14] have considered the
entropy estimation problem in the random stream
model, in which items are randomly distributed in
the stream. Chakrabarti et al. [11] have studied the
same problem but assuming the adversarial stream
model, in which the items are ordered according to
an adversarial strategy. Furthermore, Chakrabarti et
al. [11], [13] and Lall et al. [15] have considered
the challenging issue of estimating the entropy
accurately when the entropy is strictly less than
one. Such streams have a few items with a high
occurrence frequency while all the other items
appear approximately with the same low frequency.
In order to guarantee a small relative estimation
error in this setting, one needs to decompose the
analysis of the stream into two parts, one part
keeping the highly frequent items and the other part
comprising the items with the same low frequency.
More details will be given in Section IV-B.
Estimating the relative entropy of data streams
has also been shown to be an interesting tool
in the security and dependability community. For
instance, Cachin [16] defines the security of a
steganographic system in terms of the Kullback-
Leibler entropy between the distributions of the
covertext and the stegotext. Specifically, if the
relative entropy is less than or equal to a given
parameter ε then the stegosystem is considered
ε-secure, while if the relative entropy is equal
to zero (i.e., ε = 0), then the stegosystem is
perfectly secure. Anceaume et al. [17] have pro-
posed a characterization of the adversarial power to
bias uniform and ergodic sampling in large scale
system. This characterization is done in terms of
the relative entropy between a stream composed
of node identifiers and a uniform stream. More
precisely, the authors have derived lower bounds on
the work that an adversary has to exert to bias this
input stream so that uniform and ergodic sampling
does not hold.
A fundamental issue is to derive efficient al-
gorithms both in space and time to estimate the
relative entropy in presence of huge amount of
data.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. System Model
We consider a system in which a node P receives
a large data stream σ = a1, a2, . . . , am, where
the i-th element ai of the stream is called an
item. This node P might be a router that watches
TCP/IP packets [2], a stegosystem [16] or a peer
sampling component [17]. In the following, we
describe a single instance of P , but clearly multiple
instances of P may co-exist in a system. The value
u of an item is assumed to be drawn from a
large universe N and the length of the stream m
is very high (e.g., 232). Moreover, items can be
repeated multiple times in the stream. The number
of distinct items in the stream is denoted by n,
and thus, we have n ≤ m. We suppose that items
arrive regularly and quickly, and due to memory
constraints, need to be processed sequentially and
in an online manner. Therefore, node P can locally
store only a small fraction of the items and perform
simple operations on them. The algorithms we
consider in this work are characterized by the fact
that they can approximate some function on σ
with a very limited amount of memory (typically
sublinear or polylogarithmic in the size of the
data stream m). We refer the reader to [18] for a
detailed description of data streaming models and
algorithms.
a) Adversary Model: We suppose that the
adversary is omnipotent in the sense that it may
actively tamper with the data stream of any node by
observing, inserting, dropping or re-ordering items
of their input stream. The activity of the adversary
can be detected by an honest node provided that it
can accurately estimate the divergence between the
observed stream and the ideal one. The presence of
such a divergence is important as it may be a good
indicator of attacks. For instance, in large scale
systems, it might be used as an alarm to prevent
the adversary from poisoning routing tables (also
called eclipse attacks [19]) by freezing routing
tables updates as long as the relative entropy is too
high. We suppose that the algorithm used by a node
to estimate the divergence is public knowledge
(i.e., to avoid some kind of security by obscurity),
however the adversary has not access to the local
random coins used in the algorithm (if any).
B. Preliminaries
Prior to describing our algorithm for estimating
the KL divergence of a stream in a single pass
using sublinear space, we first present notations
and background on data streams analysis that make
this paper self-contained.
Entropy. Intuitively, the entropy is a measure of
the randomness of a data stream σ. The entropy
Hσ is minimum (i.e., equal to zero) when all the
items in the stream are the same, and it reaches its
maximum (i.e., equal to logm)1 when all the items
in the stream are distinct. Specifically, we have
Hσ = −
∑
u∈N
pu log pu,
where pu = mu/m, for each u ∈ N , with mu =
|{j : aj = u}| representing the number of times
the value u appears in the stream σ (by convention,
0 log 0 = 0). It is commonly called the frequency
of the item u. The norm of the entropy is defined
as FH =
∑
u∈N mu logmu.
Kullback-Leibler divergence. The Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence [20], also called the rela-
tive entropy, is a robust metric for measuring the
statistical difference between two data streams. The
KL divergence is a member of a larger class of
distances known as the Ali-Silvey distances [21].
Given two probability distributions on events p =
{p1, . . . , pn} and q = {q1, . . . , qn}, the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between pu relative to qu is
defined as the expected value of the likelihood ratio
with respect to qu:
D(p||q) =
∑
u∈N
pu log
pu
qu
= H(p, q)−H(p),
where H(p) = −
∑
pu log pu is the (empirical)
entropy of p and H(p, q) = −
∑
pu log qu is the
cross entropy of p and q. As we use a logarithm
in base 2, the divergence is measured in bits.
When pn = qn, the KL divergence is minimal
and is equal to zero. Let p(U) be the uniform
distribution corresponding to a uniform stream
1Thereafter, we will denote by log the logarithm in base 2.
(i.e., ∀u ∈ σ, p
(U)
u =
1
n
), and q be the probability
distribution corresponding to the input stream. In
the rest of this paper and according to the classical
use of the KL-divergence, we consider D(q||p(U))
as a measure of the divergence of the current
stream from the ideal one. While all the distance
measures in the Ali-Silvey distances are applicable
to quantifying statistical differences between data
streams, the KL divergence is particularly suited to
our context since it gives rise to a small number of
false positives when the two data streams are not
significantly different.
Frequency moments. Frequency moments are
important statistical tools that have been introduced
by Alon et al. [12]. Computing frequency moments
Fk allows to quantify the amount of skew in a
data stream. Among the remarkable moments, F0
represents the number of distinct elements in a
stream while F1 corresponds to the size m of the
stream. For each k ≥ 0, the k-th frequency moment
Fk of σ is defined as
Fk =
∑
u∈N
mku,
where mu is defined as above.
2-universal Hash Functions. In the following,
we intensively use hash functions randomly picked
from a 2-universal hash family. A collection H of
hash functions h : {1, . . . ,M} → {0, . . . ,M ′} is
said to be 2-universal if for every two different
items x, y ∈ [M ],
Ph∈H{h(x) = h(y)} ≤
1
M ′
.
Randomized (ε, δ)-approximation Algorithm. A
randomized algorithm A is said to be an (ε, δ)-
approximation of a function φ on σ if for any
sequence of items in the input stream σ, A outputs
φˆ such that P{| φˆ−φ |> εφ} < δ, where ε, δ > 0
are given as parameters of the algorithm.
IV. DETECTING ADVERSARIAL BEHAVIORS VIA
KL DIVERGENCE ESTIMATION
A. Building Blocks
In this section, we describe three algorithms that
form the building blocks of the AnKLe algorithm.
The first one, due to Alon et al. [12] estimates the
k-th frequency moment of a stream. Although we
do not need such a quantity, we adopt the structure
of their algorithm to estimate the relative entropy
of a stream. The second algorithm due to Bar-
Yossef et al. [22] estimates the number of distinct
items in a stream. In our context this amounts to
estimating n. Finally the third algorithm, proposed
by Misra and Gries [23], estimates the k most
frequent items of a stream. All these algorithms
have been designed in the stream data model (cf.
Section III-A). For self-containment reasons, we
briefly review these building blocks and describe
their theoretical guarantees.
1) Estimating the kth Moment of a Stream:
The AnKLe algorithm is inspired from the method
of Alon, Matias and Szegedy [12] to approximate
the KL divergence of a stream. In the following,
we refer to this algorithm as the AMS algorithm.
Briefly, the core of the AMS algorithm is a ba-
sic estimator, which takes the form of a random
variable X whose mean value is exactly equal to
the kth frequency moment of a stream and whose
variance is very small. Several basic estimators
are computed on the stream (specifically s1 × s2
independent basic estimators Xij , for 1 ≤ i ≤ s1
and 1 ≤ j ≤ s2), and the final estimator Y is set
to be
Y = median1≤j≤s2
(
1
s1
s1∑
i=1
Xij
)
.
Alon et al. [12] have shown that for any ε, δ ∈
(0, 1), if s1 ≥ V ar[X]/(ε
2E[X]2) and s2 =
4 log(1/δ), then Y is a (ε, δ)-approximation of
E[X] (i.e., P{| E[X]− Y |> εE[X]} < δ).
2) Estimating the Number of Items in the
Stream: The problem of estimating the number
of distinct elements has received a lot of attention
in the data stream model. First, the seminal work
of Flajolet and Martin [24] has shown that it is
possible to compute such an estimate using only
logarithmic space in n by relying on properties
of hash functions. Afterwards, follow-up enhance-
ments have improved the accuracy of the estima-
tion [22]. (A comprehensive survey describing the
literature on distinct elements in the data stream
model is presented by Gibbons in [25].) Thereafter,
we briefly sketch the BJKST algorithm proposed
by Bar-Yossef et al. [22], which is so far the most
efficient space and time algorithm for approximat-
ing the number of distinct elements in a stream
in a single pass (and this even if the stream is
adversarially ordered).
The BJKST algorithm is based on the coordi-
nating sampling algorithm of Gibbons and Tirtha-
pura [26]. Let σ = a1, · · · , am be a a stream of
items such that ai = v ∈ [2
r] and h1, · · · , hk
be a set of k pairwise independent universal hash
functions that map symbols vi from [2
r] onto [2r].
Moreover, S1, · · · , Sk is a set of k buffers of size
t. The algorithm consists in running k instances
of the same procedure, such that procedure j uses
Algorithm 1: BJKST algorithm
Input: An input stream σ; k and t settings;
Output: The estimate Fˆ0 of the number of
distinct elements in the stream
Choose k 2-universal hash functions1
h : [n]→ [n];
Choose k 2-universal hash functions2
g : [n]→ [O(log n/ε2)];
Initialization of k buffers Sj of size t;3
for j ∈ [1. . k] do ℓj = 0;Sj = ∅;4
for ai ∈ σ do5
v = ai;6
for j = 1 to k do7
b=the largest r ≥ 0 such that the r8
rightmost bits in hj(v) are all 0;
if b ≥ ℓj and (g(v, b)) 6∈ Sj then9
Sj = Sj ∪ {(g(v, b))};10
while | Sj |> t do11
Sj = Sj \ {g(v
′, b′)} with12
b′ = ℓj ;
ℓj = ℓj + 1;13
return Fˆ0 = median1≤j≤k2
ℓj | Sj |;14
hash function hj . The hash function hj determines
the “level” of items from the stream such that half
of the items have a level equal to 1, a quarter of
them have a level equal to 2, . . . , until finally 12i
of them have a level equal to i.
Initially, the current level of a particular ℓj is
set to be 0. Afterwards, items are read from the
stream, and by hashing them, one can deduce their
level in the following way: item ai has level i if
the i rightmost bits of hj(ai) are all set to 0. If the
level of the read item is greater than or equal to
the current level ℓj then this item is stored (once)
in Sj together with its level. The current level ℓj is
incremented when more than t items have a level
greater than or equal to ℓj . Afterwards, all the
items with a level equal to ℓj are removed from
buffer Sj . When this procedure stops, at level ℓj
each item is in buffer Sj with probability 1/2
ℓj .
To ensure that the estimate Fˆ0 = 2
ℓj | Sj | is
a (ε, δ)-approximation of F0, k = 1/δ instances
of the procedure are executed, and Fˆ0 is set to
be median1≤j≤k2
ℓj | Sj |. The BJKST algorithm
improves upon the original coordinating algorithm
from Gibbons and Tirthapura mainly by decreasing
the space bound. This is achieved by using k
additional universal hash function g to store the
hash of the items in buffers Sj instead of the items
themselves [22]. The pseudo-code of the algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 1.
Bar-Yossef et al. [22] have shown that for any
ε, their algorithm outputs Fˆ0 such that
P{|Fˆ0 − F0| ≤ ε} ≥ 1− δ,
where δ = 1/3. The worst-case running time for
each input symbol is O(r+1/ε2(log(1/ε)+log r)),
and the total space required by the algorithm is
O(r + 1/ε2(log(1/ε) + log r)) bits, where O(r)
represents the space needed for implementing each
hash function.
3) Determining the Most Frequent Identifiers of
a Stream: As for counting the number of distinct
items in a stream, the problem of determining the
k most frequent items in a stream has also been
studied extensively in the data stream literature.
Thereafter, we describe a deterministic algorithm
that outputs the k most frequent items in a stream
as well as an estimate mˆu for the frequency mu
of each item, if mu > m/k. This algorithm due
to Misra and Gries [23] maintains k counters such
that for each counter, its key is the item read from
the stream and its value is related to the frequency
of items. Initially, all the counters are set to (–, 0).
Afterwards, when an item is read from the stream,
if that item has already a counter associated to it,
then this counter is incremented. If this is not the
case and if there are still free counters available,
then one of these free counters is allocated to this
new item and its value is set to 1. Otherwise,
all the allocated counters are decremented by one,
and if after this operation some of them are equal
to 0 then their keys are erased and the counters
are released. The pseudo-code of the Misra Gries
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
The Misra Gries [23] algorithm with parameter k
provides, for each item u in the stream, an estimate
mˆu satisfying
mu −
m
k
≤ mˆu ≤ mu.
The algorithm uses a space of O(k(log n+logm))
bits.
B. The AnKLe algorithm
This section presents AnKLe, the algorithm we
propose for computing the KL divergence of a
stream. Our starting point is the re-writing of the
KL divergence as follows. From Definition 1, we
Algorithm 2: Misra-Gries algorithm
Input: An input stream σ; a precision
parameter k;
Output: The set of the k most frequent items
in a stream as well as an estimate of
their frequency
for j ∈ [0. . k] do A[j]← (⊥,⊥);1
for ai ∈ σ do2
v = ai;3
if ∃u such that the item of A[u] is s then4
increment the count value of A[u];
else5
if ∃u′ such that A[u′] = (⊥,⊥) then6
A[u′] = (v, 1)7
else for i = 1 to k do8
Decrement the count of A[i];9
if the count value of A[i] = 0 then10
A[i] = (⊥,⊥)11
return A;12
have
D(qσ||p
(U))
=
n∑
i=1
qi log (qi)−
n∑
i=1
qi log
(
p
(U)
i
)
=
1
m
(
n∑
i=1
mi log
(mi
m
)
−
n∑
i=1
mi log
(
1
n
))
= log(n)− log(m) +
1
m
n∑
i=1
mi log (mi) . (1)
Thus estimating the KL-divergence amounts in
(1) estimating the number of distinct items in the
stream (i.e., F0) in order to obtain a good ap-
proximation of log(n), (2) determining the k most
frequent items in the stream, and (3) estimating the∑n
i=1mi log (mi), which corresponds to the norm
of the entropy FH .
AnKLe algorithm we propose for estimating the
KL divergence is presented in Algorithm 3. It
consists of two phases, the first one (lines 3–17)
is executed upon reception of the items of the
stream, while the second one (lines 18–26) is run
when m items have been read from the stream.
The first phase is composed of three tasks (T1, T2
and T3), which are executed in parallel. Task T1
(see line 5) estimates the number of distinct items
present in the stream, task T2 (see line 8) identifies
the k most frequent items in the stream, and T3
samples random items in the stream in order to
compute their exact frequency. Specifically, Task
T3 (lines 11–17) consists in running a sampling
estimator X on the stream. The basic estimator
X = Xi,j is designed so that its mean value
is equal to the norm of the entropy FH and its
variance is small. More precisely, we have
X = m(r log r − (r − 1) log(r − 1)) (2)
where r is the random variable representing the
number of occurrence of an item ℓ in the stream.
This item ℓ is such that its position j in the stream
is a random number in [m]. The random variable r
counts the number of times ℓ appears in the stream
from position j onwards. Formally, r is defined as
r =| {j : j ≥ ℓ, aj = aℓ} | .
We can show as in [12], [15], that the basic
estimator X is unbiased (i.e., the expectation of
X is equal to FH ). Specifically,
E[X] =
1
m
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
m(j log j − (j − 1) log(j − 1))
=
m
m
n∑
i=1
mi log(mi)
= FH . (3)
To improve the accuracy of the estimation, s1×
s2 such basic estimators Xij (for 1 ≤ i ≤ s1 and
1 ≤ j ≤ s2) are used, each one sampling a random
position in the stream. From the implementation
point of view, tracking these estimators consists in
storing s1 × s2 counters, each one counting the
number of occurrences of an item whose position
has been randomly chosen in the stream. When
item u is read from the input stream, if u has
already one or more counters assigned to it then
all these counters are incremented. In addition, if
the position at which u has been read in the stream
is one of the chosen locations, then a counter is
assigned to u, and its value is set to 1. Thus for
each of these “tracked” items, an exact count of
their frequency is continuously maintained starting
from a random position in the stream.
The post-processing phase of AnKLe algorithm
estimates the KL divergence of the input stream
according to Relation (1). This phase is executed
when m items have been read from the input
stream. In this work, we suppose thatm is a param-
eter of the algorithm, however by using techniques
proposed in Chakrabarti et al. [13] we can extend
our solution to streams whose size is a priori un-
known. To accurately estimate the KL divergence
of the stream, one needs to cope with patterns in
Algorithm 3. AnKLe algorithm
Input: An input stream σ of length m, k (number of counters in the Misra-Gries algorithm), s1
and s2 (size of the AMS-based matrix)
Output: An estimation of D(qσ||p
(U)), the KL divergence between the observed stream and the
uniform one
Choose s1 × s2 random integers in [1. .m];1
for u1 ∈ [0. . s1], u2 ∈ [0. . s2] do S[u1, u2]← (⊥,⊥);2
for aj ∈ σ do3
v = aj ;4
begin Task T1:5
Fˆ0 ← BJKST Algorithm (Algorithm 1) fed with v6
end7
begin Task T2:8
Fˆ ← Misra-Gries Algorithm (Algorithm 2) fed with v9
end10
begin Task T3:11
forall entries (u1, u2) of matrix S such that (s(u1,u2), r(u1,u2)) 6= (⊥,⊥) do12
if s(u1,u2) = s then13
r(u1,u2) ← r(u1,u2) + 1;14
if j is one the s1 × s2 random integers then15
assign (v, 1) to the first unused entry of S;16
end17
forall entries (u1, u2) of matrix S do18
if (s(u1,u2),−) ∈ Fˆ then19
Xu1,u2 ← 0 // s(u1,u2) is one of the frequent items returned by Task T2;20
else21
Xu1,u2 ← m
(
r(u1,u2) log r(u1,u2) − (r(u1,u2) − 1) log(r(u1,u2) − 1)
)
;22
YS ← average of all non null entries Xu1,u2 ;23
Y
Fˆ
←
∑
(si,ri)∈Fˆ
ri log ri;24
p← 1−max
(
0,
min
(
YS , YFˆ
)
−m
10 ·m
)
;
25
return D = log Fˆ0 − logm+
p
m
(
YS + YFˆ
)
;26
which a small number of items occur with a very
high frequency with respect to the other items.
When such patterns occur, the basic estimator X
alone is unable to compute the norm of the entropy
in bounded space [13]. Indeed, by analogy of the
calculation performed in [12], the variance of the
estimator grows with the norm of the entropy. Thus
in presence of high frequency patterns, one needs
to estimate the relative entropy using a different
approach. In Chakrabarti et al., the authors propose
to decompose the computation of the entropy as the
sum of the entropy of the most frequent items and
the estimation of the entropy of the remaining items
of the stream. In AnKLe, we extend their method to
deal with any stream distribution in order to guar-
antee that whatever the strategy of the adversary,
the error on the estimation is kept small (as shown
in Section V). Specifically, the basic estimator X
is computed on unfrequent items (cf., lines 18–23)
as done in Relation (3), while the contribution of
highly frequent items on the norm of the entropy
is directly computed as
∑
(si,ri)∈Fˆ
ri log ri (cf.,
lines 24). The set Fˆ represents the set of highly
frequent items dynamically computed in Task T2.
Finally, to prevent some of the items to appear
in both terms, we weight the contribution of both
terms by p (cf., line 26).
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of
AnKLe by comparing its estimation with the exact
value of the KL divergence computed between
the observed input stream and the uniform one.
We also compare AnKLe to adapted versions of
the estimator-based algorithms of Alon et al. [12]
and Chakrabarti et al. [13]. In the former case,
the original estimator computes the k-th frequency
moment of a stream, while in the latter case, the
original estimator measures the entropy of a stream.
In both cases, the adapted versions compute instead
the norm of the entropy.
All the experiments have been conducted on
synthetic traces of streams whose distributions are
shown in Figure 1. (Note that we use a logarithmic
scale for the y-coordinate of all the distributions).
More precisely, all the generated streams have a
length of m = 200, 000 items. We have tested 750
different settings of the following parameters: n,
the number of distinct items in the stream, s1 and
s2, which are related to size of the estimator matrix
in Task T3, and k, the number of counters used in
Task T2. For each setting of parameters, we have
conducted 10 trials of the same experiment and
compute the average and the standard deviation.
Except from the uniform distribution and the
zipf distribution with parameter α = 1, that model
respectively an ideal stream in which each item
appears exactly with the same frequency (cf. Fig-
ure 1(a)) and a realistic one in absence of any
attacks (cf. Figure 1(d)), the other four distribu-
tions capture different adversarial strategies. More
precisely:
• Figure 1(b) shows a distribution modeling
streams in which the frequency of a large
quantity of items is significantly higher than
the frequency of the remaining items. This
type of stream might reflect sybil attacks in
which the adversary aims at over-representing
a large number of node identifiers that it owns.
• Figure 1(e) depicts a distribution modeling
streams in which there is a small number of
highly frequent items. This type of stream
might correspond to an eclipse attack in which
the objective of the adversary is to poison the
routing tables of honest nodes.
• Figures 1(c) and 1(f) displays distributions
modeling streams in which a very small num-
ber of items have a very high frequency2.
These distributions might illustrate streams in
2Pascal distribution is also known as Negative Binomial
distribution.
which very few items (typically 1, 2 or 3) are
over-pushed by the adversary.
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained for the
AnKLe, AMS and CCM estimators, averaged over
45,000 experiments (i.e. 750 different settings with
10 repetitions for each setting, over 6 distributions).
The results clearly show that AnKLe outperforms
the estimator CCM for all the distributions, even
in scenario in which CCM should excel (i.e.,
Figure 1(f)), as this corresponds to a stream in
which a very frequent item exists in the observed
stream. Compared to the AMS estimator, the results
obtained with AnKLe are often really better than or
sometimes comparable to it for all the distributions,
with the exception of the zipf distribution with
α = 2. But even for this specific distribution,
the standard deviation of AnKLe is four times
smaller than the one of AMS (i.e., 0.09 versus
0.36), thus demonstrating that AnKLe provides a
more robust and stable estimation than AMS on
this distribution.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the KL di-
vergence estimation as a function of n, k, s1
and s2. In all the figures, the x-coordinate repre-
sents the number of distinct items in the stream
as a ratio of its length m. For each value of
n ∈ {m/100, . . . ,m/20}, all the other param-
eters k, s1 et s2 also vary in the experiments.
More precisely, the parameter k takes a value
in {0.1n, . . . , n}, s1 ∈ {m/100, . . . ,m/20}, and
s2 ∈ {m/100, . . . ,m/20}. The main observation
that can be drawn from Figure 2(a) is that the CCM
estimator behaves relatively badly in presence of
a small number of distinct items with frequency
uniformly distributed in the stream. However, its
accuracy increases when the number of distinct
items increases. The other two estimators are very
close to the real value of the KL divergence,
with moreover a clear advantage for AnKLe. This
observation is further confirmed in Figure 2(b)
that corresponds to a zoom of Figure 2(a). This
figure demonstrates that the estimation provided
by AnKLe is very good. In average, the AnKLe
estimation overlaps with the real value of the KL
divergence, contrary to AMS, and its standard
deviation remains small, for any values of n, and
for any variations of k, s1, and s2. Figure 2(c)
and its zoom in (cf. Figure 2(d)) further validate
the above results. In particular, we observe that
CCM is clearly not adapted to uniform and near
uniform streams, while AMS and AnKLe provide
very good estimates for these distributions. For
instance, the zoom in Figure 2(d) shows that these
(a) Uniform (b) Poisson (c) Pascal
(d) Zipf - α = 1 (e) Zipf - α = 2 (f) Zipf - α = 4
Fig. 1. Shape of distributions used for evaluating estimators. The y-ordinate is logarithmic
Distribution Exact AnKLe AMS CCM
Uniform
average 0.018240161 0.027314791 0.253219967 -1.161750384
std. dev. 0.00271478 0.029827495 0.071137525 0.015038305
Zipf – α = 1
average 0.825819381 0.688826548 1.055650933 -8.313990878
std. dev. 0.027970186 0.142217553 0.293984322 0.858649847
Zipf – α = 2
average 2.58717975 2.999794044 2.827368288 0.866992924
std. dev. 0.031286484 0.092712953 0.369015065 0.237650647
Zipf – α = 4
average 3.611623614 3.631385192 3.85458675 3.532833916
std. dev. 0.018752397 0.130210517 0.333661261 0.030785665
Pascal
average 3.40688118 3.357277524 3.650869233 2.148588258
std. dev. 0.017502656 0.075845977 0.317275996 0.205970693
Poisson
average 0.957558622 0.743131204 1.197167903 -2.089271044
std. dev. 0.013611449 0.123500666 0.193894289 0.082006954
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCES
two estimators are pretty close to the exact value
of the divergence, but still once more AnKLe pro-
vides a better robustness to parameters variations.
However, Figures 2(e) and 2(f) demonstrate that
CCM is more adapted to streams in which a very
small fraction of items occur more frequently than
the remaining ones. This is clearly shown in Fig-
ure 2(e). The estimation of AnKLe in presence of
such streams still remains good. In average, AnKLe
overlaps with the real value of the KL divergence,
but its standard deviation is a little higher than
the one of CCM for the Poisson distribution (cf.,
Table I).
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the KL divergence
estimation as a function of s1 and s2. For each
value of s1, s2 is increased from m/5000 to m/90.
Several observations can be drawn from both fig-
ures. First, the robustness of CCM estimator greatly
improves with increasing values of s1, as the cone-
shaped curves converge for s1 > m/500. On one
hand, the value towards which the CCM converges
under-estimates the KL divergence. Thus, both s1
and s2 have a greater impact on CCM robustness
than on its accuracy. On the other hand, variations
of both s1 and s2 have not impact on AMS robust-
ness. This feature does not appear in AnKLe as
the weight given to Task T2 makes it preponderant
with respect to Task T3, limiting accordingly the
lack of robustness of Task T3.
Finally, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the KL
divergence estimation as a function of k. The main
observation drawn from these figures is that AnKLe
fully overlaps with the exact value of the KL diver-
gence, which clearly demonstrates the robustness
of this estimator in presence of any input streams.
Regarding CCM, we can observe that when the
number of counters k is less than 0.1n, then
the Misra-Gries algorithm under-estimates the k
most frequent items, which degrades the estimation
of CCM. This confirms the theoretical bound of
k ≥ ⌈7ε−1⌉ shown in [13]. On the other hand,
variations of parameter k has not impact on AMS
as this estimator does not decompose its computa-
tion according to items frequency characteristics.
To summarize, experiments have validated the
impressive accuracy and robustness of AnKLe in
presence of a very large spectrum of distributions.
This illustrates the importance of the weighting
factor applied to both terms of the estimator.
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Fig. 2. KL divergence estimation as a function of n, k, s1 and s2
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In the setting of large scale distributed systems,
node receives continuously huge amount of data
in the form of a stream that they need to be able
to process and analyze on the fly without being
able to store the whole stream due to memory
constraints. A challenging issue in this setting is
to able to detect if the observed stream is conform
to the expected one or if it has been tampered with
by an adversary. Indeed, an important divergence
between the observed stream and the expected one
is usually the indication that an attack is being
conducted.
In this paper, we have proposed AnKLe, a novel
algorithm for estimating the KL divergence be-
tween the observed stream and the uniform one.
AnKLe is very efficient both in terms of space
and time, and requires only a single pass over the
data stream. Simulations also show that AnKLe
performs always better, in terms of accuracy and
robustness, than other state-of-the-art estimator-
based algorithms such as AMS [12] and CCM [13].
We left as future work the exact theoretical
analysis of the behavior of the algorithm. In par-
ticular, we want to characterize how the different
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Fig. 3. KL divergence estimation as a function of s1 and s2
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Fig. 4. KL divergence estimation as a function of k
parameters impact the precision of the estimation
and the space complexity of AnKLe (and vice-
versa). Moreover, while currently the length of
the stream m is a parameter that has to be fixed
in advance, we will design online version of the
algorithm for which the length is not specified in
advance by using standard windowing techniques.
This corresponds to realistic situations in which the
nodes regularly receive new data that they need to
take into account to update their estimator.
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